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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN OKLAHOMA CLASS
ACTION LAW
JIM T. PRIEST* & MICHAEL R. PACEWICZ**
I. Introduction
Although the political rhetoric flowing from certain quarters might suggest
that Oklahoma is a hotbed for class action litigation, the number of recently
reported cases involving class actions from both federal and state courts in
Oklahoma is relatively small. Many of these cases focus on whether class
certification is appropriate under Oklahoma's class action statute1 or its
federal equivalent.2 The common thread running through all of these cases is
that Oklahoma courts are quite meticulous when analyzing class certification
and when applying the relevant statutes.3
Part II of this Article begins with a short overview of the requirements for
class certification under both state and federal law. Part I1 discusses three
recent state court decisions on certification, including two that are arguably
inconsistent. Next, Part IV examines recent federal court decisions
concerning class actions in Oklahoma. Finally, Part V addresses new
legislation regarding class actions and concludes with thoughts about the
future of class action litigation in Oklahoma.
I. Prerequisites for a Class Action
A. Oklahoma's Class Action Statute
Section 2023 of title 12 of the Oklahoma Statutes sets forth the
* Partner, Whitten, Nelson, McGuire, Terry & Roselius, P.L.L.C., Oklahoma City,
Oklahoma. B.A., Houghton College (New York), 1977; J.D., Syracuse University, 1980.
** Associate, Crowe & Dunlevy, a Professional Corporation, Tulsa, Oklahoma. B.A.,
Northeastern State University, 1995; J.D., University of Tulsa, 2000.
The authors would like to credit and thank Pete G. Serrata, III for his invaluable assistance
in the preparation of this article.
1. 12 OKLA. STAT. § 2023 (2001).
2. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
3. See, e.g., Melot v. Okla. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 2004 OK CIV APP 25, 87 P.3d
644, cert. denied (Okla. Mar. 1, 2004); Roberson v. Painewebber, Inc., 2003 OK CIV APP 100,
81 P.3d 688, reh'g denied (Okla. Civ. App. Aug. 11, 2003); Gipson v. Sprint Communications,
Co., 2003 OK CIV APP 89, 81 P.3d 65, cert. denied (Okla. Oct. 13, 2003); KMC Leasing Inc.
v. Rockwell-Standard Corp., 2000 OK 51, 9 P.3d 683.
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prerequisites for class certification in state court.4 Section 2023(A) mandates
that the proposed class meet the requirements of numerosity, commonality,
typicality, and adequacy of representation before a court will consider
certifying the class.5 After meeting the requirements of section 2023(A), the
action must fit one or more of the categories listed under section 2023(B) for
the class action to continue.6 The category most frequently relied upon by
class action plaintiffs is found in section 2023(B)(3), which requires a finding
by the court that a predominant question of fact or law is common to the class
as a whole and that class action is the superior method for resolving the issue.7
Several general rules have emerged as Oklahoma courts have applied
section 2023. First, the party seeking certification bears the burden of
showing that the class meets the prerequisites.8 Second, when the question
is close, courts generally certify the class because the order certifying is
subject to modification up until the time of judgment on the merits.9 Third,
the relative merits of the case are irrelevant in determining certification." °
Finally, if the record on review does not show that each of the prerequisites
under section 2023(A) have been met, then the trial court abused its discretion
in granting certification."
The order of a trial court granting class certification, however, receives
great deference, 12 and will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. 3
"An abused judicial discretion is manifested when discretion is exercised to
an end or purpose notjustified by, and clearly against, reason and evidence."' 4
Where the record does not support the presence of the statutory requirements
for class certification, the trial court's action amounts to an abuse of
discretion. "
4. 12 OKLA. STAT. § 2023.
5. Id. § 2023(A); see, e.g., Ysbrand v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 2003 OK 17, 1 6, 81 P.3d
618, 624.
6. See, e.g., Gipson 16, 81 P.3d at 69; KMC Leasing 111, 9 P.3d at 688.
7. 12 OKLA. STAT. § 2023(B)(3).
8. See First Life Assurance Co. v. Mountain, 1993 OK CIV APP 20, 4, 848 P.2d 1177,
1178-79.
9. See, e.g., Ysbrand 5, 81 P.3d at 623.
10. See, e.g., KMCLeasing[ 926, 9 P.3d at 691.
11. See, e.g., Ysbrand 5, 81 P.3d at 623.
12. See Greghol L.P. v. Oryx Energy Co., 1998 OK CIV 111, 916, 959 P.2d 596, 598.
13. See Scoufos v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 2001 OK 113,1 1,41 P.3d 366, 367.
14. Patel v. OMH Med. Ctr. Inc., 1999 OK 33,9120, 987 P.2d 1185, 1194.




B. Class Actions in Federal Court
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 is the federal counterpart to Oklahoma's
section 2023.16 Indeed, since the legislature amended the Oklahoma provision
in 1984, the requirements for class certification contained in the two statutes
have been the same.' 7 Thus, Oklahoma state courts frequently draw upon
federal court decisions in resolving class action issues.' 8
Like state courts, federal courts are granted broad discretion in determining
class certification.' 9 Thus, to overturn a lower federal court's decision to
certify a class, the federal appellate court would have to find that the lower
court had abused its discretion. Even where all of the requirements of Rule
23 are satisfied, the trial court retains discretion to either grant or deny class
certification.2" Nevertheless, a federal trial court "may certify a class only if,
after rigorous analysis, it determines that the proposed class satisfies the
prerequisites ... .,,2 1 A federal appellate court will find no abuse of discretion
where the district court has applied the correct criteria to the facts of the
case.
22
III. Recent Oklahoma State Cases
The Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals recently released three notable class
action decisions for publication. 23 Two of these cases resulted in denials of
class certification,24 while the third affirmed the trial court's decision
certifying a class of homeowners in an action against an insurer.25 Notably,
two panels of the court of civil appeals reached different results when
reviewing the impact on class certification of allegations concerning
misrepresentation and fraud.
16. Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 23, with 12 OKLA. STAT. § 2023 (2001).
17. See First Life Assurance Co. v. Mountain, 1993 OK CIV APP 20, 1 3,848 P.2d 1177,
1178.
18. See, e.g., Dewey v. State ex rel. Okla. Firefighters Pension & Ret. Sys., 2001 OK 40,
18, 28 P.3d 539, 547.
19. See J.B. ex rel. Hart v. Valdez, 186 F.3d 1280, 1287 (10th Cir. 1999).
20. See Cherokee Nation of Okla. v. United States, 199 F.R.D. 357,360 (E.D. Okla. 2001).
21. Valdez, 186 F.3d at 1287.
22. See id.
23. See Melot v. Okla. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 2004 OK CIV APP 25, 87 P.3d 644,
cert. denied (Okla. Mar. 1, 2004); Roberson v. Painewebber, Inc., 2003 OK CIV APP 100, 81
P.3d 688, reh'g denied (Okla. Civ. App. Aug. 11, 2003); Gipson v. Sprint Communications Co.,
2003 OK CIV APP 89, 81 P.3d 65, cert. denied (Okla. Oct. 13, 2003).
24. Roberson 9, 81 P.3dat691; Gipson 33,81 P.3dat74.
25. Melot 28, 81 P.3d at 649.
20041
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A. Roberson v. Painewebber, Inc.
The plaintiffs in Roberson v. Painewebber, Inc.26 were investors in zero
coupon corporate bonds supported largely by mortgages on a Tulsa office
building and by the tenancy of one of the building's largest tenants.27 The
plaintiffs' petition alleged that the building appraisal was grossly inflated, that
they were not informed of this fact, and that the defendant's brokers induced
them into buying the bonds using uniform sales materials. 2 Bringing claims
of fraud and breach of fiduciary duty, the plaintiffs sought to certify a
nationwide class.29 The trial court denied class certification, and the plaintiffs
appealed only that part of the ruling pertaining to their fraud claim.3"
The plaintiffs argued on appeal that: (1) the trial court had ignored
substantial evidence showing commonality regarding standardized fraudulent
sales methods or omissions of material fact; (2) the trial court had improperly
found that fraud claims based in part on oral misrepresentations were not
suitable for class certification; (3) the trial court had improperly found that
individual reliance issues would overwhelm common issues; and (4) the trial
court had ignored the rule that close questions of class certification should be
resolved in favor of certifying the class.3' The Oklahoma Court of Civil
Appeals affirmed, finding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
denying class certification.32
The court of civil appeals noted that plaintiffs' fraud claims included at
least 375 investors who had purchased bonds pursuant to a prospectus and
dealings with numerous brokers scattered across twenty states.33 Not all of the
bondholders received the prospectus, however, and the brokers used an
assortment of internal documents when speaking with potential investors.34
The internal documents were not shown to potential investors and did not
include all of the information in the prospectus. 35
In general, fraud claims based upon oral misrepresentations are not
appropriate for class certification because each plaintiff must prove that he
26. 2003 OK CIV APP 100, 81 P.3d 688, reh'g denied (Okla. Civ. App. Aug. 11, 2003).
27. Id. 3, 81 P.3d at 690.
28. Id.
29. Id. I 3-4 & n.4, 81 P.3d at 690 & n.4.
30. Id. 4, 81 P.3d at 690.
31. Id.
32. Id. 9, 82 P.3d at 691.
33. Id. 5, 81 P.3d at 690.





relied upon the alleged misrepresentation.36 The plaintiffs in Roberson
attempted to avoid this pitfall by arguing that the internal documents used by
the brokers when speaking with potential investors constituted a "script."37
Both the trial court and the court of civil appeals rejected this argument,
finding that the alleged oral misrepresentations and omissions formed the
bases of the fraud claims and that individual issues of reliance predominated
over common issues. Finally, the court of civil appeals found that the record
did not support the plaintiffs' argument that class certification was a close
question, and thus affirmed the trial court's order denying certification.39
B. Melot v. Oklahoma Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co.
In Melot v. Oklahoma Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co.,' the plaintiffs
filed an insurance claim with the defendant after a storm had damaged their
home.4" The parties subsequently agreed on an amount, and the insurer paid
the claim.42 The homeowners then sued, alleging that the defendant had a
practice of underpaying property damage claims by failing to include a 20%
allowance for overhead and profit that general contractors routinely charge on
home repair jobs involving three or more trades.43
In their petition, the plaintiffs brought claims for breach of contract, bad
faith, and fraud.' The petition was filed individually on behalf of the
plaintiffs and on behalf of others who were insured by the defendant and
"whose claims for covered damage to their dwellings were intentionally
under-adjusted in that [the defendant] failed to include adequate and timely
payments for contractor's profit and overhead."45 The trial court granted class
certification and defined the class as:
All Oklahoma citizens who were or are Oklahoma Farm Bureau
Mutual Insurance Company homeowner policyholders:
who suffered a covered loss to their home on or after June 8,
1999;
36. See Bunch v. Kmart Corp., 1995 OK CIV APP 41, 6, 898 P.2d 170, 172.
37. See Roberson 6, 898 P.2d at 690.
38. Id. 6, 898 P.2d at 690-91.
39. Id. 8, 898 P.2d at 691.
40. 2004 OK CIV APP 25, 87 P.3d 644, cert. denied (Okla. Mar. 1, 2004).
41. Id. 2, 87 P.3d at 645.
42. Id. 2, 87 P.3d at 644-45.
43. Id. U 2-3, 87 P.3d at 645.
44. Id. 3, 87 P.3d at 645.
45. Id.
2004]
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whose losses were adjusted on an actual cash value (ACV) or
replacement cost (RC) basis;
whose Oklahoma Farm Bureau worksheets/estimates indicate
involvement of three trades or more; and
whose damage adjustments did not include adequately
calculated and timely tendered compensation for general
contractor's overhead and profit.46
On appeal, after summarily dispensing with the defendant's arguments
concerning whether the class was sufficiently identifiable and whether it was
overly broad because of statute of limitations considerations, the court of civil
appeals analyzed the statutory requirements. The court determined that the
plaintiffs met the typicality requirement of section 2023(A)(3) because the
"[p]laintiffs' legal theories of recovery arise from allegations of a common
course of deceptive conduct equally affecting themselves and the putative
class members."47 The appeals court further found that the record was devoid
of any indication that the plaintiffs lacked personal knowledge of the
circumstances of the case or that they lacked understanding of the issues
involved.48 Thus, the court concluded, the plaintiffs could adequately
represent the class.49
The appellate court also concluded that the plaintiffs met the predominance
requirement of section 2023(B)(3).5" This analysis required the court to
determine whether individual questions predominated the common questions
of law or factY The court found that the trial court's definition of the class
as those insureds who suffered covered losses to their homes did not require
individual inquiry because the record reflected that the defendant had already
determined whether each loss was covered.52 The court then addressed the
defendant's argument that determining whether damage adjustments were
adequately calculated depended on individualized questions of whether any
particular insured was entitled to payment for overhead and profit.53 The court
noted that while the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant had an "across the
board pattern" of failing to pay the charge when the job involved three or
46. Id. 4, 87 P.3d at 646.
47. Id. 16, 87 P.3d at 647.
48. Id. 1 17, 87 P.3d at 647.
49. See id.
50. Id. 26, 87 P.3d at 649.
51. See id. 19, 87 P.3d at 648 (citing Mattoon v. City of Norman, 1981 OK 92, 20,633
P.2d 735, 739).
52. Id. 21, 87 P.3d at 648.




more trades, the defendant never asserted that it individually assessed claims
before determining if insureds were entitled to the 20% charge for overhead
and profit. 4 The court concluded that the question of the plaintiffs'
entitlement to the 20% charge went to the merits of the case, and was
therefore inappropriate for determining class certification."
The defendant further argued that the commonality requirement was not
met because individualized inquiries would be necessary to determine what
constituted a "trade" and to address the issue of reliance implicated by the
plaintiffs' tort claims.5 6 The court of civil appeals rejected the first argument,
finding that the trial court's definition limited the class to those individual
homes where the defendant's own worksheets indicated the need for three or
more trades. 7 Thus, the court concluded that the defendant had already
determined what constituted a "trade. 58
The appellate court also rejected the defendant's second argument. After
acknowledging the holding in Bunch v. Kmart Corp.59 - that individualized
issues of reliance based on oral misrepresentations render a class action
inappropriate - the court applied the reasoning of a subsequent Oklahoma
Supreme Court case, Black Hawk Oil Co. v. Exxon Corp.60 In doing so, the
court of civil appeals stated, "In the instant case, while the alleged omissions
of information may not have been written, they were standardized in that
Plaintiffs have asserted that Insurer made the same omissions to all members
of the class. Under this analysis, the commonality requirement has been
met."
61
As indicated, the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals relied on Black Hawk
Oil to uphold certification of the plaintiffs' fraud claims in Melot. The
plaintiffs in Black Hawk Oil, who were natural gas producers, sued a gas plant
owner alleging that the owner failed to account for slop oil produced during
gas processing. 62 The defendant, relying on Bunch v. Kmart, argued that class
certification was inappropriate. 3 The Oklahoma Supreme Court noted that
while Bunch involved oral misrepresentations concerning the need for
automotive repairs, the plaintiffs in Black Hawk Oil "claim[ed] that
54. Id. 24, 87 P.3d at 649.
55. Id. 1 25, 87 P.3d at 649.
56. Id. n[ 12-13, 87 P.3d at 647.
57. Id. 12, 87 P.3d at 647.
58. Id.
59. 1995 OK CIV APP 41,918, 898 P.2d 170, 172.
60. 1998 OK 70, 969 P.2d 337.
61. Melot[ 15, 87 P.3d at 647 (emphasis added).
62. Black Hawk Oil 4, 969 P.2d at 340.
63. Id. 1 30, 969 P.2d at 345.
2004]
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defendants failed to account for slop oil in monthly accountings that
defendants rendered to plaintiffs and other members of the class, although
defendants admittedly collected and sold the slop oil."' The court then stated
that "' [t]he need to show individual reliance has not precluded class treatment
in cases where standardized written misrepresentations have been made to
class members."65
Some might argue that the conclusion reached by the court of civil appeals
in Melot runs counter to that reached by its sister panel in Roberson, where the
court found unavailing the plaintiffs' allegation that the oral
misrepresentations and omissions of the defendant's brokers were essentially
scripted. 66 In Roberson, some of the plaintiffs received copies of the
prospectus, and the brokers used written internal memoranda when speaking
with potential investors. 67 The use of written memoranda in the solicitation
of investors, however, suggests that the omissions and misrepresentations in
Roberson were similar to those in Melot.
6s
Trial courts' broad discretion in ruling on class certification may provide
some explanation for the differing decisions in Roberson and Melot. Also, the
focus in Melot was on the defendant's omissions rather than its
representations 69 and Black Hawk Oil similarly involved omissions.7° Thus,
Melot serves to further distinguish the differences between omissions and
misrepresentations as addressed in Black Hawk Oil.
C. Gipson v. Sprint Communications Co.
1. Trial Court Proceedings
The trial court's discretion to determine class certification in the first
instance is not without limits. Occasionally one of Oklahoma's appellate
64. Id.
65. Id. (quoting NEWBERG ON CLAss ACrloNs § 22.49 (3d ed. 1992)) (emphasis added).
66. See Roberson v. Painewebber, Inc., 2003 OK CIV APP 100, 6, 81 P.3d 688,690-91,
reh'g denied (Okla. Civ. App. Aug. 11, 2003). On May 16,2005, the Oklahoma Supreme Court
granted certiorari to review the court of civil appeals decision in Bill Burgess v. Farmers
Insurance Co., Case No. 99,739 (Okla. May 16, 2005), in which the court of appeals reversed
a trial court's certification of a class. Thus, the Oklahoma Supreme Court appears poised to
issue a definitive opinion on class certification that may resolve this confusion.
67. Roberson 6, 81 P.3d at 690.
68. Compare id., with Melot v. Okla. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 2004 OK CIV APP 25,
15, 87 P.3d 644, 647, cert. denied (Okla. Mar. 1, 2004).
69. Melot 15, 87 P.3d at 647.




courts concludes that a trial court has crossed the line, which was the case in
Gipson v. Sprint Communications Co.
71
In Gipson, the plaintiff alleged that Sprint had paid railroads for permission
to install fiber optic cable in underground conduits along railroad easements.72
The plaintiff claimed that the easements did not permit any use beyond
operation of a railroad, and that Sprint's installation of the cable without first
obtaining landowners' permission or providing compensation constituted
trespass. 73 The plaintiff sought damages for trespass, unjust enrichment,
ejectment, and removal of the fiber optic cable.74
The plaintiff sought to certify a class consisting of all persons owning an
interest in land in the United States across which Sprint had installed cable
without permission, without the use of legal process, and without paying
compensation. 75 Regarding the requirements of section 2023(A), the plaintiff
asserted that the large number of affected landowners made joinder
impractical and that the class members' damages were too small to justify
separate lawsuits. 6
The plaintiff further asserted that his claims were representative of the
claims of the other class members,77 and that he would fairly and adequately
protect the interests of the class.7 ' The plaintiff asserted that the proposed
class members shared three common questions of law and fact: (1) whether
the actions of Sprint amounted to trespass; (2) whether Sprint had been
unjustly enriched; and (3) whether the class members were entitled to
exclusive possession of their property, free of the cables and related
hardware. 79 Lastly, the plaintiff alleged that all of the grounds contained in
section 2023(B) were present in the case.80
The trial court certified the class, limiting it geographically to the State of
Oklahoma.8' In doing so, the trial court determined that the class included
71. 2003 OK CIV APP 89, 81 P.3d 65, cert. denied (Okla. Oct. 13, 2003).
72. ld. 2, 81 P.3d at 66.
73. Id.
74. Id.






81. See id. 7, 81 P.3d at 67. The court defined the class as:
[A]II persons owning a fee simple interest in land in the State of Oklahoma
across which any railroad has a right-of-way, and excluding land owned by the
railroad in fee simple where Sprint installed fiber optic cable or other
telecommunications cable without permission, without the use of legal process and
20041
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hundreds, if not thousands of Oklahomans, and that eight questions of law or
fact were common to the class.8 2 The trial court further found the plaintiff's
claims typical of the claims of the class members because both were based on
theories of trespass and unjust enrichment.8 3 Additionally, the trial court
noted that the easement on the plaintiff s property was part of a much larger
railroad right-of-way created by an 1886 federal act.84 Thus, the trial court
reasoned, all of the landowners along that right-of-way would be affected by
a decision concerning the effect of that conveyance.8 ' The trial court found
that because the plaintiff had retained counsel experienced in class actions and
held no interests adverse to the other class members, the plaintiff had satisfied
the adequacy of representation test of section 2023(A)(4).86
Turning to section 2023(B)(1), the trial court determined that a common
adjudication of the issues was necessary to prevent inconsistent results and to
prevent Sprint from maintaining the cable in its location if the company was
found to be at fault.87 The court also found that individual adjudications
would be impractical because Sprint would not be able to operate its network
of cable if some landowners prevailed on ejectment claims while others did
not.8
The trial court also found certification appropriate under section
2023(B)(3). Section 2023(B)(3) requires that "the questions of law or fact
common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting
only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available
methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. '89 The
court rejected Sprint's arguments that individual issues of ownership over the
rights-of-way predominated over common issues and that each class member
would require a minitrial to determine damages.90 In determining that a class
action would be superior to other methods for adjudicating the controversy,
without paying compensation. Excluded from the Class are all parents,
subsidiaries, and affiliates of the Defendant as well as all officers and directors of
the Defendant. Property currently owned by State or Federal governments are also
excluded from the Class.
Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. 8, 81 P.3d at 68.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. 10, 81 P.3d at 68.
87. Id. 11, 81 P.3d at 68.
88. ld.
89. 12 OKLA. STAT. § 2023(B)(3) (2001).




the trial court noted that Sprint had argued for class certification when
attempting to settle similar cases in Illinois and Louisiana.9' The court held
that Sprint could not argue that the plaintiff failed to meet the requirements for
class certification in the present case after taking the opposite position before
the Illinois and Louisiana courts.92
2. The Case on Appeal
The Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals reversed, finding that the trial court
had abused its discretion.93 Focusing on the requirements of section
2023(B)(3), the appellate court determined that common issues did not
predominate over individual issues.94 The court found that no fewer than six
merit-based decisions would be required before class membership could be
established:
1) fee simple ownership of land in Oklahoma, 2) across which any
railroad has a right-of-way, 3) but excluding land owned by the
railroad in fee simple (where Sprint installed fiber optic cable or
other telecommunications cable), 4) without permission, 5) without
the use of legal process and 6) without paying compensation.9
The court then found that the predominance of individual issues precluded
a finding that a class action was the superior method for a fair and efficient
adjudication of the controversy. 96 Thus, the plaintiff had failed to establish
91. Id. 14, 81 P.3d at 69.
92. Id.
93. Id. 1, 81 P.3d at 66.
94. Id. 23, 81 P.3d at 71.
95. Id.
96. Id. 25, 81 P.3d at 72. In noting that the individual issues, which predominated the
case, precluded a finding that the plaintiff's claims were typical of the class as required by
section 2023(A)(3), the court stated:
The individual conveyances involved necessitate that potential class members will
have myriad types of easements or full ownership in the railroad rights-of-way.
For example, the land grant allegedly at issue here provides that the railroad right-
of-way may be used for the purpose of installing telephone lines. So, it is entirely
possible that certain landowners will have no claim for trespass at all, while other
landowners may have acquired their lands subject to the right-of-way through a
different conveyance which may not include telephone lines as a permitted use of
the easement. Accordingly, there will not be a typical claim... in this case.
Id. 26, 81 P.3d at 72 (citing Nudell v. Burlington, N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., No. A3-01-41,2002
WL 1543725 (D.N.D. July 11, 2002); Chambers v. MCI WorldCom, No. 00-C-0348, 2000 WL
34229953 (W.D. Wisc. Oct. 10, 2000); Hallaba v. WorldCom Network Servs., Inc., 196 F.R.D.
630 (N.D. Okla. 2000); Swisher v. United States, 189 F.R.D. 638 (D. Kan. 1999)).
2004]
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either prong of the test outlined in section 2023(B)(3), which effectively
doomed the proposed class action in Gipson.
Finally, the court of civil appeals found that Sprint had not acknowledged
that class certification was appropriate in Gipson simply because it had argued
in favor of certification before courts in Illinois and Louisiana.97 The court
recognized that Sprint had argued for class certification in Louisiana solely for
purposes of settlement.98 Additionally, the court noted that while settlement
may be relevant in determining class certification, it is "not de facto support
for certification of a class for trial."99 The court concluded that while
consideration of Sprint's actions in other courts was appropriate, the
company's efforts to certify certain classes for settlement purposes did not
override the predominating individual issues present in Gipson.'00
Absent a superseding decision by the Oklahoma Supreme Court, it would
appear that Oklahoma has joined with the majority view that landowner suits
involving fiber optic cable installed in railroad rights-of-way are not
appropriate for class action litigation. As the court of civil appeals
acknowledged, however, plaintiffs continue to press the issue with occasional
success. 101
IV. Recent Federal Court Decisions
Four recent federal trial court decisions in Oklahoma contribute to the
continuing conversation on class actions; they are discussed in chronological
order.
A. Millsap v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.
Millsap v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 102 an unreported decision, dealt with
recovery of attorney fees in a successful class action brought by former
employees of the McDonnell Douglas Corporation (MDC).' °3 MDC closed
97. Id. U 31-32, 81 P.3d at 73-74.
98. Id. 131, 81 P.3d at 73-74.
99. Id. 32,81 P.3d at 74 (citing Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997)).
In Amchem, the U.S. Supreme Court reasoned that a trial court faced with a request for
settlement-only certification need not consider whether trial of the case would present severe
management problems because no trial is contemplated. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 593.
100. Gipson 32, 81 P.3d at 74.
101. See id. 33 n.8, 81 P.3d at 74 n.8 (noting that a state court in Illinois certified a
nationwide class action in a case involving Sprint while Gipson was on appeal).





its Tulsa plant and laid off over one thousand employees."° The plaintiffs'
class, consisting of approximately 1100 former employees, asserted that MDC
closed the plant to deny them pension and insurance benefits protected by the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA).'05 After nine years of
litigation and bench trials on liability and damages, the parties ultimately
entered into a stipulation of settlement, which was approved by the court."°6
The district court's decision in Millsap provides great insight on the issue
of appropriate attorney fees in a class action case. The settlement created a
$36 million common fund, which the court allocated among class members,
reimbursed costs to the plaintiffs' counsel, and awarded an unspecified
attorney fee.1 7 The plaintiffs' counsel had sought $8.75 million as their fee,
which constituted 25% of the recovery.'0 8 The trial court granted the fee."°
The Millsap decision contains several important findings on the issue of
class action attorney fees. First, in determining an appropriate attorney fee in
a class action where a "common fund of recovery" is to be distributed to the
class, courts may use the "percentage of the fund method" in determining
reasonable attorney fees in lieu of the lodestar method."0 The percentage
method will most likely result in a higher attorney fee award.
Second, unlike some jurisdictions, the Tenth Circuit provides that a trial
court may use either the lodestar or the percentage of the fund method or a
combination of the two."' Recent trends suggest a preference for the
percentage of the fund method.12 Under both approaches, the Tenth Circuit
advocates that courts use the twelve factors announced by the Fifth Circuit in
Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc. "3 to determine the appropriateness
of an attorney fee."' Thus, the Tenth Circuit adopts what it calls a "hybrid
approach," combining lodestar factors with the percentage method. '5
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at *2.
107. Id. at *3.
108. Id.
109. Id. at *14.
110. Id. at *4. The court calculates attorney fees under the lodestar method by multiplying
the attorney's rate by the attorney's hours on the case.
111. Id. at *5.
112. Id.
113. 48 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974).
114. Millsap, 2003 WL 21277124 at *5.
115. Id.
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Third, in calculating appropriate attorney fees in a class action, the trial
court acts as a fiduciary for the plaintiff class members.' 16 In Milisap, the trial
court took this responsibility very seriously and sought input and advice from
a three-member panel of special masters, as well as the magistrate judge who
had presided over many aspects of the litigation.117 Ultimately, the trial court
in Millsap awarded 25%, or $8.75 million, to the plaintiffs' counsel, finding
that such an award was "proper, and even a conservative, percentage of the
common fund to be awarded in this case."
'1 18
Millsap provides a historical, tactical outline of the process involved in a
successful nine-year class action. Both plaintiff and defense counsel in class
actions would be well advised to familiarize themselves with Millsap.
B. Flowers v. EZPawn Oklahoma, Inc.
The second recent decision from Oklahoma federal district courts is
Flowers v. EZPawn Oklahoma, Inc."9 Flowers was a class action filed on
behalf of individuals who received "pay day loans" at allegedly usurious rates
of interest. 20 Rochell Flowers filed the action in state court on behalf of all
Oklahomans who had received such loans. The defendant attempted to
remove the case to federal court, alleging both diversity and federal question
jurisdiction under banking laws.'21
The trial judge, who found no evidence that each putative member of the
proposed class had suffered damages in excess of the jurisdictionally requisite
$75,000, affirmed the magistrate's decision to remand the case.' The federal
court declined jurisdiction despite the fact that the petition sought
compensatory, punitive, and injunctive relief, which the defendant claimed
would exceed $75,000.123 The court held that each class member must have
a claim that exceeds the jurisdictional amount to establish diversity
jurisdiction.124
Thus, to establish federal jurisdiction in a class action suit brought in the
Tenth Circuit, each class member must claim damages exceeding $75,000.125
Although a split of authority exists among the federal circuits on this point,
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at *7.
119. 307 F. Supp. 2d 1191 (N.D. Okla. 2004).
120. Id. at 1196.
121. Id. at 1197.
122. Id. at 1198-01.
123. Id. at 1198-99.





the district court in Flowers said that it would follow Tenth Circuit law until
such law was overruled by the U.S. Supreme Court.
26
C. Anderson v. Boeing Co.
A third federal trial court opinion in the class action arena is Anderson v.
Boeing Co.,127 a decision concerning a Title VII gender discrimination claim.
The female employee plaintiffs sued Boeing under a variety of legal theories,
principally over unequal pay and overtime. 28 Judge Claire Eagan analyzed
both the statistical underpinnings of the plaintiff s class claim, as well as the
plaintiffs ability to meet the four prerequisites outlined in Federal Rule
23(a).
129
The plaintiffs in Anderson secured the services of a nationally renowned
statistician to (1) analyze Boeing's pay records, and (2) determine whether
gender disparity existed in compensation and overtime. 3° The plaintiffs
statistical expert, Bernard R. Siskin, Ph.D., concluded that such a disparity
existed. 3' The plaintiffs argued that Siskin's opinion was a sufficient basis
to conclude that a "common practice" existed through Boeing's Oklahoma
facilities, thus justifying class certification.
132
The defendant attacked Siskin's opinion as flawed and foundationless, but
ultimately failed to undermine Siskin's credibility and defeat certification. 1
33
The court contrasted the fairly low-level standard applied to experts at the
class certification stage with the more exacting standard used to screen experts
under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 134 In her opinion, Judge
Eagan declared that "the Court must determine only that Siskin's testimony
is not so fatally flawed as to be inadmissible as a matter of law."' 35 Using this
standard, the court found Siskin's testimony admissible and considered it as
part of the basis for class certification.
36
After preliminarily accepting Siskin's statistics, the court then turned to
"[t]he four prerequisites to a class action . . . commonly referred to as
126. Id. at 1194.
127. 222 F.R.D. 521 (N.D. Okla. 2004).
128. Id. at 526-27.
129. See generally id.
130. Id. at 527-29.
131. Id. at528.
132. Id. at 529.
133. Id. at 525-29.
134. Id. at 525-29; see Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
135. Anderson, 222 F.R.D. at 528.
136. Id. at 530.
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numerosity, commonality, typicality and adequacy of representation.' 37 The
opinion examined in detail the countervailing arguments on these points and
found each was satisfied, militating in favor of certification. Accordingly,
Judge Eagan gave great weight to the Tenth Circuit standard in favor of class
certification.
13 8
With the Anderson case still ongoing, it remains to be seen whether the case
will ultimately make it to trial as a class action or whether later developments
will suggest that a modification to class certification is appropriate. Anderson
illustrates that courts will apply a lighter standard to expert testimony at the
class certification stage than at the Daubert stage, which favors those seeking
certification of a class.
D. Grabow v. PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP
The final federal trial court opinion worth noting is Grabow v.
PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP. '39 Grabow is less substantive in its discussion
of class certification than the Anderson opinion because it principally deals
with an interpretation of federal securities law."4
The plaintiff brought an action in state court on behalf of a class of
investors who allegedly held certain shares in reliance on representations
made by PricewaterhouseCoopers (PWC). 14' PWC attempted to remove the
case based on federal securities law that governed the sale or purchase of
securities. 142 The plaintiffs moved for remand to state court, arguing that the
lawsuit alleged that the plaintiffs had held shares because of PWC's
misrepresentations - not that the plaintiffs had bought or sold shares.' 43
After examining the language of the federal statute, the Grabow court
remanded the case, concluding that federal securities law did not apply to the
plaintiffs' class because the petition made no allegation of buying or selling
shares.'44
Although the Grabow decision does not speak directly about class actions,
it offers constructive advice between the lines. First, plaintiffs' class counsel
137. Id.
138. Id. at 531 ("The Tenth Circuit has stated that 'if there is to be an error made, let it be
in favor and not against the maintenance of the class action, for it is always subject to
modification should later developments during the course of the trial so require."') (quoting
Esplin v. Hirschi, 402 F.2d 94, 99 (10th Cir. 1968)).
139. 313 F. Supp. 2d 1152 (N.D. Okla. 2004).
140. See generally id.
141. Id. at 1153.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 1153-55.




should carefully evaluate the nature and scope of their allegations before filing
and drafting petitions. Plaintiffs' counsel must anticipate removal and, if they
wish to avoid it, carefully draft their petitions. In Grabow, the plaintiffs'
lawyer attempted to amend the petition after removal in an effort to defeat
federal jurisdiction, but Judge Eagan correctly determined that such an
amendment came too late.
45
Second, defense counsel should draft removal petitions in a way that
maximizes the likelihood of defeating attempts to remand. Like the result for
the plaintiffs in Grabow, however, courts judge the propriety of removal at the
time of removal, not by subsequent amendments or affidavits submitted by
either side.1
46
These recent federal district court opinions appear uniform in this respect:
these courts will carefully analyze each aspect of a class action case to
determine whether an adequate basis for federal jurisdiction exists. Once the
jurisdictional threshold is cleared, federal courts will apply an equally
exacting scrutiny to the appropriateness of class certification.1
47 If a strong
basis for jurisdiction coexists with a plausible basis for certification, the
federal courthouse doors will be open for those classes wishing to enter.
V. Changes to Procedures Regarding Attorney Fees for Class Actions
Oklahoma House Bill 2661 created a new law regarding the awarding of
attorney fees in class action lawsuits. 48 This statute requires courts to
conduct evidentiary hearings to determine fee awards for class counsel, and
specifically establishes the judge as a fiduciary to the class 
members.149
Currently, the trial judge grants and determines fees based on motions by the
parties. " 0 The enactment of House Bill 2661 will have little practical effect
on the awarding of attorney fees in class actions except that state court judges
will be required to hold evidentiary hearings to determine the amount of
awards.15'
145. Id. at 1155 n.l.
146. Id. at 1154.
147. See id.; Flowers v. EZPawn Okla., Inc., 307 F. Supp. 2d 1191, 1197 (N.D. Okla. 2004).
148. H.B. 2661, c. 368, § 1, effective Nov. 1, 2004 (codified at 5 OKLA. STAT. § 7.1 (Supp.
2005)).
149. 5 OKLA. STAT. § 7.1.
150. See, e.g., Marlin Oil Co. v. Barby Energy Corp., 2002 OK CIV APP 92, 6, 55 P.3d
446, 448.
151. 5 OKLA. STAT. § 7.1.
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VI. Conclusion
The cases and statutes surveyed show that class action law continues to
evolve in both Oklahoma and federal courts. Future cases will show whether
the expansion of Black Hawk Oil by Melot is a sound policy decision, and
whether the Tenth Circuit's method of determining the jurisdictional amount
for class actions in diversity cases will prevail. Despite these unresolved
issues, these cases reveal that the main issue for lawyers on both sides is class
certification, which both state and federal courts take very seriously in
applying class certification statutes.
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